Tafsir of Al-An'am 6:111

Surah Al-An'am 6:111

ﱁ ﱂ ﱃ ﱄ ﱅ ﱆ ﱇ ﱈ ﱉ ﱊ ﱋ ﱌ ﱍ ﱎ ﱏ ﱐ ﱑ ﱒ ﱓ ﱔ ﱕ ﱖ ﱗ

And even if We had sent down to them the angels [with the message] and the dead spoke to them [of it] and We gathered together every [created] thing in front of them, they would not believe unless Allah should will. But most of them, [of that], are ignorant.

Tafsir

Mafatih al-Ghayb

Verse range: 6:111

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Al-An'am (The Cattle): (111) And if We had sent down to them angels...

Know that the Almighty, in this verse, detailed what He mentioned previously in a general manner by saying: {And what will make you know that even if We sent down the angels, they would not believe?}

He clarified that even if God granted them what they requested—sending down angels and resurrecting the dead so they could speak to them—and even if He increased upon that beyond their demands, such as gathering everything before them as a proof, {they would not believe unless Allah wills.}

In this verse, there are several issues:

Issue 1: Context of Revelation

Ibn Abbas narrated that the mockers of the Qur'an were five: Al-Walid ibn Al-Mughirah Al-Makhzumi, Al-'As ibn Wa'il Al-Sahmi, Al-Aswad ibn 'Abd Yaghuth Al-Zuhri, Al-Aswad ibn Al-Muttalib, and Al-Harith ibn Hanzalah. They came to the Prophet (peace be upon him) with a group from Mecca and said: "Show us the angels to testify that you are the Messenger of God, or send back some of our dead so we can ask them if what you say is true or false, or bring God and the angels qabīlan (as guarantors) for what you claim." This verse was then revealed.

We have repeatedly mentioned that since they agreed that this Surah was revealed all at once, determining the specific occasion for the revelation of this verse was problematic. However, based on the established view—that the purpose is to refute their oath that if a sign came, they would surely believe in Muhammad (PBUH)—God mentioned this statement to expose their falsehood. It shows that sending signs after signs and miracles after miracles is futile. Indeed, one miracle is necessary to distinguish the truthful from the liar, but adding more is arbitrary. If more were granted, they could demand a third after the second, and a fourth after the third, which would prevent the argument from ever being settled, thus blocking the door to prophethood.

Issue 2: The Reading of {qabīlan}

There are different readings for the word {qabīlan} here and in Surah Al-Kahf:

  1. Nafi' and Ibn 'Amir read it with a kasra on the qāf and a fatḥa on the bā' (qabīlan).
  2. 'Asim, Hamzah, and Al-Kisā'ī read it with a ḍammah on the qāf (qubūlan).
  3. Ibn Kathir and Abu 'Amr read it with a kasra on the qāf (qabīlan).

Al-Wāḥidī said that Abu Zayd stated that meeting someone qabīlan, muqābalatan, qibalan, and qubūlan all mean the same thing: facing someone directly.

  • If we follow Abu Zayd: The meaning is the same despite the difference in pronunciation.
  • If we differentiate the meanings:
    • For the reading {qabīlan} (kasra on qāf, fatḥa on bā'): Abu 'Ubaydah, Al-Farrā', and Al-Zajjāj said it means openly/visibly ('iyānan). It is said, "I met him qabīlan" meaning face-to-face. It is narrated that Abu Dharr said he asked the Prophet (PBUH), "Was Adam a Prophet?" He replied, "Yes, he was a Prophet whom God spoke to qabīlan (directly/visibly)."
    • For the reading {qubūlan} (ḍammah on qāf): There are three interpretations:
      1. It is the plural of qabīl, meaning guarantor/surety. The meaning would be: even if We gathered everything against them and they became guarantors for the truth of their claims, they would not believe. The miraculous aspect here is that some of the gathered things speak, and some do not. If God made them all speak and they agreed to accept this guarantee, it would be one of the greatest miracles.
      2. It is the plural of qabīl meaning kind/sort (ṣinf). The meaning would be: We would gather every kind against them, one kind after another (qabīlan qabīlan). The miraculous aspect is gathering them after death, and despite their differing natures, they would gather in one place.
      3. It means face-to-face/visibly, as interpreted by Abu Zayd.

Regarding the statement: {they would not believe unless Allah wills}

This contains two issues:

Issue 1: Divine Will and Belief

The meaning of the verse is that even if God showed these strange and wondrous things to these disbelievers, they would not believe unless God willed their belief.

  • Our position (Ashā'irah): Since they did not believe, this proves that God did not will their belief. This is explicit proof on the matter.
  • The Mu'tazilah position: This proves that God willed belief from all disbelievers. Al-Jubbā'ī mentioned their famous arguments:
    1. If God did not will their belief, belief would not be obligatory upon them, just as it is not obligatory if He did not command it.
    2. If God willed disbelief from the disbeliever, the disbeliever would be obedient to God by committing disbelief, as obedience means doing what is willed.
    3. If it were permissible for God to will disbelief, it would be permissible for Him to command it.
    4. If it were permissible for Him to will disbelief from them, it would be permissible for Him to command us to will disbelief from them.
    • They conclude that these proofs establish that God only willed belief from them. However, the apparent meaning of the verse suggests God did not will their belief. Since contradiction is impossible, reconciliation is necessary. They reconcile this by saying God willed belief from everyone, which they perform by choice, but God did not will the belief that comes through compulsion (ilja' and qahr). This resolves the apparent contradiction.

Refutation of the Mu'tazilah Position

This argument is weak for several reasons:

  1. The Nature of "Volitional Belief": If by "volitional belief" they mean that human power is equally capable of belief and disbelief, and belief results without any favoring motive or distinguishing will, this is asserting that one possibility is favored over the other without a determinant, which is impossible. Furthermore, even if this were conceptually sound, the resulting belief would not originate from the person, but would be an event without a cause or agent, as the power involved is equally inclined to both opposites, and no specialization occurred. This invalidates the concept of action, agent, and effect altogether—a position no rational person holds.
  2. Alternative Definition: If their "volitional belief" means that while power is capable of both, it only produces belief when a motive for belief is added, then the source of belief is the combination of power plus the motive. This combination necessitates belief, which is precisely what they call compulsion (jabr), which they deny. Thus, their concept of "volitional belief" lacks any coherent meaning.
  1. The Scope of the Negation: Even if we grant that "volitional belief" is distinct from belief caused by God's creation, the verse states: {And if We had sent down the angels... they would not believe}. This means they would not believe with volitional belief. It is not impossible that they might believe through compulsion (ilja' or qahr) when such signs appear. Therefore, the negation applies only to volitional belief. The exception, {unless Allah wills}, must be of the same kind as the negated subject. Since compelled belief is not of the same kind as volitional belief, the exception cannot refer to compelled belief. Thus, the meaning of {unless Allah wills} must be volitional belief. This validates the position of our scholars and completely invalidates the Mu'tazilah objection.

Issue 2: The Temporality of Divine Will

Al-Jubbā'ī argued that the statement {unless Allah wills} indicates the contingency (newness) of God's Will. If His Will were eternal, one could not say, "Zayd will not go to Basra unless God wills it." The structure implies that the occurrence of the consequence (Zayd's going) is suspended upon the occurrence of the condition (God's Will). If the condition (Will) were eternal, the consequence (the act) would also have to be eternal. Since we know the act is contingent (new), the condition (Will) must also be contingent.

The Answer: Although the Divine Will (Mashi'ah) itself is eternal, its attachment (ta'alluq) to the creation of a contingent event at that specific time is a contingent addition. This is sufficient to validate the statement.

Finally, God concludes the verse with: {But most of them do not know}.

  • Our scholars: They mean they do not know that everything is from God, by His decree and predestination.
  • The Mu'tazilah: They mean they did not know that they would remain disbelievers even after the signs they requested and the miracles they demanded appeared, as most of them assumed otherwise.

7 < {And thus We have made for every prophet an enemy—devils from mankind and jinn, inspiring to one another embellished speech, out of delusion. But if your Lord had willed, they would not have done it; so leave them and that which they invent.} > 7

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(The translation continues with the next verse.)