Al-An'am (The Cattle): Verses 148–149

Context and Introduction

Allah (Exalted is He) has recounted how the people of ignorance (Jahiliyyah) presumed to legislate concerning Allah's religion without any proof or evidence. He then recounts their excuse for all the disbelief they commit:

They say: "If Allah had willed that we should not commit Shirk (polytheism), He would have prevented us from it. Since He did not prevent us, it proves that He wills it for us. If Allah wills it, it is impossible for us to abandon it, so we are excused."

In this verse, there are several important issues:

Issue 1: The Mu'tazila's Argument Regarding Divine Will

The Mu'tazila claim that this verse proves their doctrine concerning the Divine Will over created things, arguing from seven perspectives:

First Point: Allah recounts the explicit statement of the Mujabbira (those who believe in absolute predestination) through the mouths of the disbelievers: "If Allah had willed that we should not commit Shirk, we would not have committed Shirk." Since Allah recounts this statement in a context of censure and condemnation, it necessitates that this doctrine (of the Mujabbira) is blameworthy and false.

Second Point: Allah says, {كَذَّبُوا} (Kadhdhabū). There are two readings: with takhfīf (lightening, Kadhdhabū) and with tashdīd (intensification, Kadhdhabū).

1. The light reading (Kadhdhabū): This explicitly states that they lied in that assertion. This proves that what the Mujabbira assert on this matter is a lie.
2. The intensified reading (Kadhdhabū): This cannot be interpreted to mean they deserved blame because they lied to the adherents of other doctrines. If we held that meaning, it would contradict the meaning implied by the light reading, leading to a contradiction within Allah's speech, which is impossible. Therefore, this reading must mean that every disbeliever in past times who denied a Prophet did so using this same method: "Since everything happens by Allah's Will, my disbelief, which is what I am upon, only occurred by Allah's Will, so He did not prevent me." This is the consistent path for all past and present disbelievers in refuting the Prophets' call. If we interpret the verse this way, the intensified reading confirms the light reading, and the combination of both readings proves the falsehood of the Mujabbira's position.

Third Point: The verse states, {حَتَّى ذَاقُوا بَأْسَنَا} ("until they tasted Our might"). This indicates that they deserved Allah's threat because they adhered to this doctrine.

Fourth Point: Allah says, {قُلْ أَهُمْ عِندَكُمْ مِنْ عِلْمٍ} ("Say: Do you have any knowledge?") followed by {وَقَالُوا لَنَا} ("and they said: To us"). This is clearly a rhetorical question expressing denial, indicating that those who hold this view have no knowledge or proof for it. This proves the doctrine's corruption, as everything true is based on knowledge.

Fifth Point: Allah says, {إِن يَتَّبِعُونَ إِلَّا الظَّنَّ} ("They follow nothing but conjecture"), even though in other verses Allah states: {إِنَّ الظَّنَّ لَا يُغْنِي مِنَ الْحَقِّ شَيْئًا} ("Indeed, conjecture is of no use against the truth").

Sixth Point: Allah says, {وَإِنْ هُمْ إِلَّا يَخْرُصُونَ} ("And they are only guessing/falsifying"). Kharṣ (falsification/conjecture) is the ugliest form of lying, and Allah also says, {قُتِلَ الْخَرَّاصُونَ} ("Cursed be the guessers/falsifiers").

Seventh Point: Allah says, {قُلْ فَلِلَّهِ الْحُجَّةُ الْبَالِغَةُ} ("Say: So, to Allah belongs the conclusive argument"). The reasoning is: The disbelievers used the argument of Divine Will to defend themselves against the Prophets' call: "Everything that occurs is by Allah's Will. If He wills this from us, how can we abandon it? If we are incapable of abandoning it, how can He command us to abandon it? Is it within our capacity to perform an act contrary to Allah's Will?" This is the disbelievers' argument against the Prophets. Allah responds: {فَلِلَّهِ الْحُجَّةُ الْبَالِغَةُ} ("So, to Allah belongs the conclusive argument") in two ways:

1. First Way: Allah granted you complete intellects, sufficient understanding, hearing ears, and seeing eyes. He empowered you for both good and evil, completely removing excuses and impediments. If you wish, you go toward good deeds; if you wish, toward sins and evils. This power and capacity are known necessarily to exist, as is the removal of impediments. Since this is the case, your claim that you are incapable of faith and obedience is false. Thus, what we have mentioned proves that you have no conclusive argument against Allah; rather, Allah has the conclusive argument against you.
2. Second Way: You claim that if our actions occurred contrary to Allah's Will, it would mean Allah was overpowered and subdued by us, forcing us to act against His Will. This implies He is incapable and weak, which detracts from His status as God. Allah answers this by saying: Incapacity and weakness only apply if I were unable to compel you toward faith and obedience through force. But I am capable of that, which is what {وَلَوْ شَاءَ لَهَدَاكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ} ("And if He had willed, He could have guided you all") means. However, I do not compel you to faith and obedience because that would nullify the wisdom intended by accountability (taklīf). This explanation proves that your assertion—that if we acted contrary to Allah's Will, it would imply His incapacity—is false.

This is the extent of what the Mu'tazila can derive from this verse.

The Refutation (The Accepted Answer)

The established answer in this matter is: We have already demonstrated that this entire Sura proves the correctness of our doctrine, and we have refuted all the interpretations they offer for every verse with clear, strong answers supported by decisive rational proofs.

If this is established, and if this verse meant what you claim, it would result in a clear contradiction within the Book of Allah, which constitutes the greatest form of criticism against it.

Given this, we say: Allah recounts that they said, {لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكْنَا} ("If Allah had willed, we would not have committed Shirk"), and immediately follows it with {كَذَلِكَ كَذَّبَ الَّذِينَ مِن قَبْلِهِمْ} ("Thus did those before them deny"). This indicates that the people argued: Since everything is by Allah's Will and Decree, accountability (taklīf) is futile, and thus the call of the Prophets and their prophethood are false.

Allah then clarifies that relying on this path to invalidate prophethood is false. This is because He is God who does what He wills and judges as He wills, and no one can object to His actions. Thus, Allah wills disbelief from the disbeliever, yet He sends Prophets to him and commands him to believe. The occurrence of a command contrary to the Will is not impossible.

The Summary: Allah recounts that the disbelievers rely on Allah's Will to invalidate the prophethood of the Prophets. Then, Allah clarifies that this inference is flawed and false. The existence of Divine Will over all matters does not necessitate the invalidation of the Prophets' call. Based on this principle alone, their inference collapses entirely. All the points you raised regarding censure and condemnation relate to your reliance on the existence of Allah's Will to refute the Prophets' call. Therefore, the conclusion is that this inference is false, and it contains absolutely nothing that proves the doctrine of Divine Will itself is false.

If they argue: "This excuse is only valid if we read {كَذَّبَ} with the tashdīd (intensification). But if we read it with takhfīf (lightening), this excuse collapses entirely." We respond with two points:

1. First: We deny the validity of this reading (takhfīf). The proof is that we have shown this entire Sura proves our doctrine. If this verse supported their view, it would lead to contradiction, and the Qur'an would cease to be the speech of Allah. This contradiction is averted by rejecting this reading, which necessitates adopting the other reading.
2. Second: We accept the validity of this reading for argument's sake. We interpret it to mean that the people lied in the assertion that the existence of Allah's Will over all human actions necessitates the nullification of prophethood and the invalidity of their call. If we interpret it this way, the Mu'tazila have absolutely no basis left in this verse. Praise be to Allah who helped us escape this difficult responsibility.

What strengthens our position is the narration that Ibn Abbas, after losing his sight, was asked about those who deny Qadar (Divine Decree). He replied: "If any of them are in the house, I will confront them! Have they not read: {إِنَّا كُلَّ شَيْءٍ خَلَقْنَاهُ بِقَدَرٍ} (The Moon: 49) and {إِنَّا نَحْنُ نُحْيِي الْمَوْتَى وَنَكْتُبُ مَا قَدَّمُوا وَآثَارَهُمْ} (Ya-Sin: 12)?" Ibn Abbas also said: "The first thing Allah created was the Pen. He commanded it: 'Write Decree.' So it flowed with whatever will happen until the Hour." The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: "The deniers of Divine Decree are the Magians of this Ummah."

Issue 2: Grammatical Structure (Conjunction)

Sibawayh claimed that conjoining an explicit noun/pronoun (ẓāhir) to a raised pronoun (muḍmar marfūʿ) in a verb is ugly. Thus, one should not say: Qumtu wa Zayd ("I stood up, and Zayd"). The reason is that the thing being conjoined (maʿṭūf) is secondary (a branch), while the thing it is conjoined to (maʿṭūf ʿalayhi) is primary (the root). The pronoun is weak, while the explicit noun is strong; making the strong a branch of the weak is impermissible.

If this principle is established, in affirmative statements, the pronoun must be reinforced: Qumtu anā wa Zayd ("I stood up, and Zayd"). In negative statements, one says: Mā qumtu wa lā Zayd ("Neither I nor Zayd stood up").

Applying this to the verse: {لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكْنَا وَلَا آبَاؤُنَا} ("If Allah had willed, we would not have committed Shirk, nor would our fathers"). Here, {وَلَا آبَاؤُنَا} is conjoined to the pronoun in {مَا أَشْرَكْنَا}. However, the particle lā intervenes, which makes this conjunction permissible.

Al-Isfahani’s Jāmiʿ states that the conjunction particle must follow the word reinforcing the pronoun for the conjunction to be sound and to avoid the aforementioned issue of making the strong subordinate to the weak. This is achieved if we say: {مَا أَشْرَكْنَا نَحْنُ وَلَا آبَاؤُنَا} so that the word lā precedes the conjunction particle. Here, the conjunction particle precedes lā, bringing back the problem.

The Answer: The particle lā when introduced before {آبَاؤُنَا} necessitates the implied omission of a verb there. This is because negating the action to the fathers themselves is impossible; rather, this negation must apply to an action originating from them, which is Shirk. Thus, the implied meaning is: Mā ashraknā wa lā ashraka ābā’unā ("We did not commit Shirk, nor did our fathers commit Shirk"). With this implied structure, the difficulty is removed.

Issue 3: The Argument for Divine Will (The Lāw Clause)

Our scholars use the verse {فَلَوْ شَاءَ لَهَدَاكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ} ("And if He had willed, He would have guided you all") as proof that everything is by Allah's Will. The particle law (if) in Arabic implies the negation of one thing due to the negation of another. This indicates that Allah did not will guidance for them, and consequently, He did not guide them.

The rational proof is: If the disbeliever's power to commit disbelief is not also a power to believe, then Allah, in this scenario, did not empower him to believe. If He then willed belief from him, He willed an action without the power to perform that action, which is impossible. Willing the impossible is impossible.

If the power to disbelieve is also the power to believe, then the preference for one of the two options depends on the existence of a preponderant motive (dāʿiyah murajjiḥah).

• If we say Allah created that motive, then the preponderant motive exists along with the power. The combination of these two necessitates the action. Since the action (belief) did not occur, we know that motive did not occur. If the motive did not occur, belief is impossible for him. If belief is impossible for him, it is impossible for Allah to will it from him, because willing the impossible is impossible. Thus, the apparent meaning of the Qur'an indicates that Allah did not will belief from the disbeliever, and the rational proof we established also indicates this. Their position is refuted from all angles.

As for their claim that this verse must be interpreted as referring only to the Will of Compulsion (mashī’at al-ilja’): This interpretation is only appropriate if rational proof established the impossibility of adhering to the apparent meaning of the text. If rational proof establishes that the truth is precisely what the apparent meaning indicates, why resort to interpretation?

Furthermore, this argument (for restricting the meaning) is false for several reasons:

1. First: This statement necessarily requires an implied element. We say the implication is: "If Allah had willed guidance, He would have guided you." You (Mu'tazila) say the implication is: "If Allah had willed guidance through compulsion, He would have guided you." Your implication is longer, making your statement weaker.
2. Second: Allah wills voluntary belief from the disbeliever. Belief achieved through compulsion is not the same as belief achieved voluntarily. Under your interpretation, it necessitates that Allah is incapable of achieving His goal, because His goal is voluntary belief, and He is utterly incapable of achieving it. Thus, the claim of incapacity is unavoidable.
3. Third: This statement depends on distinguishing between belief achieved voluntarily and belief achieved through compulsion. Voluntary belief cannot occur except upon the presence of a decisive motive and an absolute Will. The motive that results in action is either one that must result in action, or one that may not result in action.
   • If it must result in action, it is the necessary motive, and there is no difference between it and the motive resulting from compulsion.
   • If it does not necessitate the action, then the action can fail to occur. We must then assume the action sometimes occurs and sometimes fails to occur. The distinction between these two times must be due to an additional preponderant factor (murajjiḥ zā’id). The state before this factor was the complete motive, which we already assumed. This leads to a contradiction (khalf). When this additional factor is added, if the action becomes necessary, it is no different from the necessary motive. If it is not necessary, it requires yet another additional factor, leading to an infinite regress (tasalsul), which is impossible.

Thus, the distinction they draw between the voluntary motive and the necessary motive, while seemingly valid on the surface, has no substance upon rigorous investigation.

Verse 150

{قُلْ هَلُمَّ شُهَدَاءَكُمُ الَّذِينَ يَشْهَدُونَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ حَرَّمَ هَٰذَا ۖ فَإِن شَهِدُوا فَلَا تَشْهَدْ مَعَهُمْ ۖ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَ الَّذِينَ كَذَّبُوا بِآيَاتِنَا وَالَّذِينَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِالْآخِرَةِ وَهُم بِرَبِّهِمْ يَعْدِلُونَ}

"Say: 'Bring forth your witnesses who testify that Allah has forbidden this.' But if they testify, do not testify with them, and do not follow the desires of those who denied Our verses, and those who do not believe in the Hereafter, while they equate others with their Lord."