Tafsir of An-Nazi'at 79:27

Surah An-Nazi'at 79:27

ﱳ ﱴ ﱵ ﱶ ﱷ ﱸ ﱹ

Are you a more difficult creation or is the heaven? Allah constructed it.

Tafsir

Mafatih al-Ghayb

Verse range: 79:27

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Surah An-Nazi'at: (27) Are you stronger in creation...

Then know that when the Almighty concluded this narrative, He returned to address those who deny the Resurrection, saying: {Are you stronger in creation, or is the heaven that He constructed?} (An-Nazi'at: 27). In this verse, there are two issues:

Issue 1: The Purpose of this Argument

There are two interpretations regarding the objective of this line of reasoning:

  1. Argument against the Deniers of Resurrection: The verse serves as a proof against those who deny the Resurrection. He says: {Are you stronger in creation, or is the heaven that He constructed?} By this, He draws their attention to something observable by sight. The creation of man, in his smallness and weakness, is trivial when compared to the vastness and magnitude of the heaven. Thus, the Almighty demonstrates that the creation of the heaven is greater. If this is the case, then recreating them (after death) is even more probable to be within the power of the Almighty. How then can they deny it? This is similar to His saying: {Is not He who created the heavens and the earth capable of creating the like of them?} (Al-Isra: 99) and {The creation of the heavens and the earth is greater than the creation of mankind} (Ghafir: 57). The meaning is: Is your recreation after death harder, or the creation of the heaven, in your estimation? For both matters are equal concerning the power of Allah.
  1. Demonstrating Human Creation: The second view is that the purpose is to establish that they themselves are created beings. This view is weak for two reasons:
    • If someone denies that man was created, it is more logical that they would deny the creation of the heaven first.
    • Since the beginning of the Surah dealt with the issue of gathering and resurrection, it is more appropriate to connect this statement to that topic.

Issue 2: Grammatical Analysis of the Verse

Al-Kisa'i, Al-Farra', and Al-Zajjaj held that the statement concludes at {or is the heaven} (Am as-samaa').

Then, His statement {that He constructed it} (banāhā) is the beginning of a new clause.

However, Abu Hatim held that the pause should be after {that He constructed it} (banāhā). He argued that banāhā is related to as-samaa' (the heaven), with the implied structure being: "Or is the heaven which He constructed?" (Am as-samaa' allatī banāhā), where allatī (which) is omitted, a permissible omission in Arabic.

Al-Qaffal stated that this is like saying: "The man who came to you is sensible" (ar-rajulu jā’uka ‘āqilun), meaning "The man who came to you is sensible."

If we accept that this omission is permissible in the language, the evidence that {that He constructed it} (banāhā) is a relative clause (silah) for as-samaa' is as follows: If it were not a relative clause, it would be an adjective (sifah). Then {He raised its vault} (verse 28) would also be an adjective. This would result in two consecutive adjectives with no conjunction between them, which would necessitate a conjunction (like wa), as seen in {and He darkened its night} (verse 29). Since no conjunction is present, we know that {that He constructed it} (banāhā) is a relative clause for as-samaa', and {He raised its vault} (rafa‘a samkahā) begins a new statement describing its attributes.

Al-Farra' can counter this by arguing that if {that He constructed it} (banāhā) were a relative clause, the meaning would imply that there exists a heaven which Allah constructed, and another heaven which He did not construct, which is false.

Issue 3: Proof that Allah is the Builder of the Heaven

There are several arguments proving that the Almighty is the one who constructed the heaven:

Argument 1: The Nature of Body (Jism)

  1. The heaven is a body (jism). Every body is contingent (muhdath) because if a body were eternal (azali), it would eternally be either in motion or at rest. Both possibilities are invalid:
    • Motion is impossible: The essence of motion requires being preceded by something else, while the essence of eternity negates being preceded by anything. Combining them is impossible.
    • Rest is impossible: Rest is a positive attribute (wasf thubūti) that is capable of ceasing. Everything capable of ceasing requires an active agent (fa'il mukhtār). Everything requiring such an agent is contingent (muhdath). Therefore, all rest is contingent, making it impossible for it to be eternal.
    • We establish rest as a positive attribute because the state of the body changes from motion to rest while its essence remains. One of these states must be positive. If rest is the positive state, the point is proven. If motion is the positive state, rest must also be positive, because motion is defined as occupying a place after occupying another, while rest is defined as occupying the same place after occupying it. The difference between motion and rest is not in their essence but in the precedence by another entity (or lack thereof), which is an external, accidental attribute. If the essence is an existing reality in one form (motion), it must be so in the other (rest).
    • We establish that the rest of the heaven is capable of ceasing because if it were necessary by its own nature, it could not cease. But we see the heaven currently in motion. Thus, if it were at rest eternally, that rest must have been capable of ceasing.
    • Since that rest was possible by its nature, it required an active agent (fa'il mukhtār). Because it was possible by nature, it needed an effective cause (mu'aththir). This cause cannot be necessary (mūjib), because if it were necessary and its causation of that effect was independent of any condition, its permanence would necessitate the permanence of the effect (the rest), meaning the rest could not cease. If the necessary cause required a necessary condition for its causation, the permanence of both cause and condition would necessitate the permanence of the effect. If the cause or the condition were not necessary by itself, it leads to an infinite regress (tasalsul), which is impossible, or it terminates in a necessary cause and a necessary condition, leading back to the first obligation (that the rest should be eternal).
    • Therefore, the effective cause must be an active agent (fa'il mukhtār). Since every rest is the act of an active agent, everything done by an active agent is contingent, because an active agent acts through intention (qasd), and intending to create what already exists is impossible.
    • Thus, every rest is contingent. It is impossible for the body to be eternally neither moving nor at rest; therefore, it was non-existent eternally. It is contingent and requires a creator for its existence and the composition of its parts—and that is Allah, the Almighty. Reason proves that the Builder of the heaven is Allah.

Argument 2: Contingency and Causality

  1. Everything other than the Necessary Existent (al-Wājib) is contingent (mumkin).
  2. Every contingent being is contingent by its essence (mumkin bi-dhātihi). (If we assumed two necessary existents, they would share existence but differ in specific identity. Each would be composed of what they share and what distinguishes them. Anything composite requires its parts, and its parts are other than itself, making it dependent on something else. Anything dependent on something else is contingent by its essence. This leads to contradiction if both were necessary.)
  3. Every contingent being requires an effective cause (mu'aththir).
  4. Everything requiring an effective cause is contingent (muhdath), because dependence on a cause cannot persist eternally (as that would imply the cause creating itself). It must occur either at the moment of origination or from a state of non-existence. In both cases, contingency is necessary.
  5. Therefore, everything other than the Necessary Existent is contingent, and every contingent being must have a creator. The heaven must have a builder.

Argument 3: Specificity of Measure

  1. Pure reason testifies that the mass of the heaven could conceivably be smaller by the size of a mustard seed, or larger by the size of a mustard seed, than it currently is.
  2. The selection of this specific measure, to the exclusion of larger or smaller measures, must be due to a specific determiner (mukhaṣṣiṣ). Therefore, the heaven must have a builder.

Addressing the Objection: Could Allah have created an intermediary agent?

If one asks: "Why can't Allah create something and grant it the power to create bodies, making that creature the creator and builder of the heaven?"

  • View 1 (Reliance on Revelation): Some scholars say that reason proves the heaven must have a creator, and ultimately, this must terminate in an eternal, necessary being, who is Allah. However, the negation of an intermediary is known only through revelation (sam'iyyah). Thus, the phrase {that He constructed it} (banāhā) in this verse indicates that the builder is Allah and no one else.
  • View 2 (Proof by Reason): Others argue that reason proves the invalidity of an intermediary. Since everything other than Allah is contingent, the ultimate power must be an active agent, not a necessary cause (qādir lā mūjib). An object is only capable of being subject to power (maqdūr) because it is contingent. If contingency were removed, only necessity or impossibility would remain, both of which preclude being subject to power. Since the reason for something being subject to Allah's power (contingency) is general among all contingent things, the power of Allah must apply equally to all contingent things. If Allah is capable of all contingent things, then if we posit another capable agent capable of some contingent things, it would imply a single contingent act occurring between two agents from the same source. This is impossible:
    • It cannot occur by one agent without the other, as both are equally capable of causing it.
    • It cannot occur by both simultaneously, as each agent, being independently capable, would render the other unnecessary, leading to the contradiction of needing both and being independent of both simultaneously.
    • Therefore, it is impossible for any contingent act to occur through any other power besides the power of Allah. This argument is sound, provided one accepts that only one ultimate effective agent exists.

This concludes the discussion on this section.

Know that after establishing that the Almighty constructed the heaven, He then explains how He constructed it, detailing that manner in several ways:

! 7 < { He raised its vault and perfected it } > 7

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