Tafsir of Al-Baqarah 2:19

Then, God Almighty repeated the matter of their state with another parable, to further uncover their condition after the first uncovering and to clarify it after clarification. Just as it is incumbent upon the eloquent speaker—in places of brevity and conciseness—to be brief and concise, it is likewise incumbent upon him—in places of detail and elaboration—to detail and elaborate. Al-Jahiz recited: (They inspire with long speeches, and at times / The inspiration of glances, for fear of the watchers.)

Among the repeated parables in the Revelation is His saying: “And not equal are the blind and the seeing, nor the darkness and the light, nor the shade and the heat, and not equal are the living and the dead” (Fatir: 21). Do you not see what Dhu al-Rumma did in his poem: (Is that her, or is the one who dyes with saffron her pasture?)

If you ask: In the first parable, the hypocrite was likened to one who kindles a fire, his outward profession of faith to the light, and the cessation of his benefit to the extinguishing of the fire. What, then, is likened to the sayyib (downpour), the darkness, the thunder, the lightning, and the thunderbolts in the second parable? I say: One may say that the religion of Islam is likened to the sayyib because hearts are brought to life by it, just as the earth is brought to life by rain. The unbelievers’ attachment to it is likened to the darkness; the promises and threats within it are likened to the thunder and lightning; and the terror, calamities, and trials that befall the disbelievers from the side of the people of Islam are likened to the thunderbolts. The meaning is: "Or like those who possess a downpour," meaning a people overtaken by the sky in this state, experiencing what they experienced from it.

If you ask: This is a comparison of things to things, so where are the objects of comparison (the mushabbahat)? Why was it not made explicit, as in His saying: “And not equal are the blind and the seeing, nor those who believe and do righteous deeds, nor the evildoer” (Ghafir: 58), or as in the verse of Imru’ al-Qays: (As if the hearts of birds, fresh or dried / At their nests, were jujubes and withered raisins.) I say: Just as it comes explicitly, it also comes with the mention folded away, following the path of metaphor, as in His saying: “And not equal are the two seas: one is fresh, sweet, and pleasant to drink, and the other is salt and bitter” (Fatir: 12), and “God presents an example: a man belonging to partners quarreling, and a man belonging wholly to one man” (Az-Zumar: 39). The correct view, which the scholars of rhetoric hold and do not deviate from, is that both parables are among the "composite" parables, not the "separated" ones. One should not force a comparison of each individual part to something else; this is the authoritative view and the profound doctrine. Its explanation is that the Arabs take things individually, isolated from one another—not one taking hold of the other—and compare them to their counterparts, as Imru’ al-Qays did and as occurs in the Quran. Or, they compare a state resulting from a collection of things that have joined and adhered until they became one thing, to another like it, such as His saying: “The example of those who were entrusted with the Torah...” (Al-Jumu'ah: 5). The purpose is to liken the state of the Jews in their ignorance of the Torah and its dazzling signs to the state of a donkey in its ignorance of the volumes of wisdom it carries.

As for the idea that individual parts are meant to be compared to individual parts, independent of one another, this is not the case. Thus, when He described the hypocrites falling into their misguidance and the confusion and bewilderment they stumbled in, their confusion and the severity of their situation were likened to what one suffers whose fire has been extinguished after being kindled in the darkness of the night, and likewise one who is overtaken by the sky on a dark night with thunder, lightning, and fear of thunderbolts.

If you ask: In the "separated" comparison, you estimated the deletion of the genitive (the mudaf), saying "or like those who possess a downpour." Do you estimate the same in the "composite" one? I say: Were it not for the need for a referent in His saying: “They put their fingers in their ears,” I would have no need for such an estimation, for I observe the quality derived from the whole of the speech. It does not matter to me whether the particle of comparison is followed by a singular noun or not. Do you not see His saying: “The example of the worldly life is only like water...” (Yunus: 24)? How the kaf (particle of comparison) is followed by "water," yet the purpose is not to compare the world to water or any other singular thing that one would struggle to estimate.

If you ask: Which of the two parables is more eloquent? I say: The second, because it is more indicative of the extremity of confusion, the severity of the situation, and its horror. That is why He placed it last, as they progress in such matters from the lighter to the heavier.

If you ask: Why was one parable joined to the other with the particle of doubt (aw - or)? I say: Aw in its origin is for equality between two or more things in doubt, then it was expanded and borrowed for equality in non-doubt. For example, "Sit with Al-Hasan or Ibn Sirin," meaning they are equal in the propriety of being sat with. Likewise, His saying: “And do not obey from among them a sinner or a disbeliever” (Al-Insan: 24), meaning the sinner and the disbeliever are equal in the necessity of disobeying them. So too is His saying: “Or like a downpour.” It means the state of the hypocrites' story is likened to the states of these two stories, and the two stories are equal in that each is sufficient as a parable; if you liken it to either, you are correct, and if you liken it to both, it is the same.

Al-Sayyib is the rain that yasubu (descends and falls). It is also said of clouds. Al-Shammakh said: (And a dark, dense one, with true thunder, a downpour.) It is indefinite because a specific, intense, and terrifying type of rain is intended, just as the fire was indefinite in the first parable. It is also read as ka-sa'ib. Al-Sayyib is more eloquent. Al-Sama' (the sky) is this canopy.

Al-Sa'iqah (thunderbolt) is a crash of thunder with which a streak of fire descends. It is said to spark from the clouds when their masses collide; it is a subtle, sharp fire. It does not pass by anything without consuming it, though despite its sharpness, it is quick to extinguish. It is said that it fell on a palm tree and burned about half of it, then went out. Sa'aqathu al-sa'iqah means it destroyed him, so he sa'iqa (died), either from the intensity of the sound or the burning.

The statement "God encompasses the disbelievers" is a metaphor; the meaning is that they cannot escape Him, just as one who is encompassed cannot escape the one who encompasses him in reality. This sentence is an interruption with no grammatical place. Al-khatf is taking something quickly.

“Whenever it lights for them” is a third commencement, as if it were an answer to one who asks: "What do they do during the flashes and the darkness of the lightning?" This is a parable for the severity of the situation for the hypocrites, mirroring the severity for those in the downpour, and the extreme bewilderment they are in regarding what to do. When they encounter a flash of lightning, they seize the opportunity to take a few steps; when it fades, they remain standing, unable to move. If God had willed, He would have increased the thunder's crash and deafened them, or the lightning's light and blinded them.

“And God is over all things competent”—the thing (shay') is that which can be known and reported. Al-Shay' is masculine and is the most general of the general, just as "God" is the most specific of the specific. It applies to bodies, accidents, and the Eternal. You say "a thing not like things," meaning a known entity not like other known entities. It also applies to the non-existent and the impossible. If you ask how it is said "competent over all things" when some things have no relation to the Competent One (like the impossible), I say: it is a condition in the definition of the "competent" that the act not be impossible. Thus, the impossible is excluded by its own nature when mentioning the One competent over all things.