Surah Al-Mulk (The Sovereignty)

It has thirty verses and is a Meccan Surah.

Surah Al-Mulk is also called Al-Munjiyah (The Saving One) because it saves its reciter from the torment of the grave. It is narrated from Ibn Abbas that he used to call it Al-Mujadilah (The Contender/Debater) because it argues on behalf of its reciter in the grave. It has thirty verses and is Meccan.

Translation:

Surah Al-Mulk (67): Verses 1-2

Verse 1:

Translation and Commentary (Al-Razi's Approach):

Regarding His saying: {Blessed is He} (Tabāraka), we have already explained this at the beginning of Surah Al-Furqan.

As for His saying: {in Whose Hand is the Dominion} (bi-yadihi al-mulk): Know that this phrase is used to emphasize His status as Sovereign and Owner. Just as one says, "The command, prohibition, release, and binding are in the hand of so-and-so," without implying a physical limb.

The author of Al-Kashshāf stated: {In His Hand is the Dominion} over everything that exists, and {He is over all things Capable} (Qadīr) concerning all possibilities that have not yet come into existence.

Regarding His saying: {And He is over all things Capable}, there are several issues:

This verse is used by those who claim that the non-existent is a thing (shay’).

Argument for the Non-Existent being a Thing:

1. The statement {Indeed, Allah is Capable of all things} necessitates that what He is capable of creating (maqdūr) must be a thing.
2. This thing that Allah is capable of creating is either existent or non-existent.
3. It cannot be existent, because if He were capable of creating the existent, He would either be capable of bringing it into existence (which is impossible, as bringing the existent into existence is impossible) or capable of annihilating it.
4. Annihilation (i‘dām) by an agent is impossible because power (qudra) is an effective attribute requiring an effect. Non-existence is pure negation; therefore, making non-existence the effect of power is impossible. Thus, annihilation by an agent is impossible.
5. Therefore, the thing that is subject to His power cannot be existent; it must be non-existent. This necessitates that the non-existent is indeed a thing.

The Counter-Argument (by our scholars who deny the non-existent is a thing): They use this very verse to argue against the claim:

1. An essence (like jawhar) as an essence, and a color (like blackness) as blackness, are undoubtedly things.
2. Allah is Capable of all things. By this verse, He must be capable of the essence as an essence, and of blackness as blackness.
3. If so, the existence of the essence as an essence, or blackness as blackness, would be dependent on an agent (Allah).
4. A choosing agent must precede their action. Thus, Allah's existence and essence must precede the essence becoming an essence or blackness becoming blackness.
5. This necessitates that the non-existent is not a thing—which is the desired conclusion.

Response to the Opponent's Doubt: We do not concede that annihilation cannot occur by an agent. Even if we conceded that, why can we not say that the maqdūr (the object of power) which is non-existent is called a thing because it will become a thing? Although this is metaphorical, it must be accepted due to the other proofs demonstrating that the non-existent is not truly a thing.

Al-Qadi Abu Bakr, in one of his opinions, claimed that the annihilation of bodies occurs through an agent. This is the view adopted by Abu al-Hasan al-Khayyat (from the Mu'tazila) and Mahmud al-Khwarizmi.

The majority opinion among us (Ash'arites) and the Mu'tazila is that annihilation occurring through an agent is impossible.

Argument for Annihilation by Agent (Al-Qadi's basis):

1. Existent things are things.
2. Allah is Capable of all things.
3. Therefore, He is capable of the existent things.
4. He is either capable of creating them (impossible, as creation of the existent is impossible) or capable of annihilating them. This implies the possibility of annihilation occurring through an agent.

The majority of the Mu'tazila claimed that Allah is not capable of creating the like of what a servant creates. Al-Nidham and Abu Hashim claimed He is not capable of the servant's actual action.

Our scholars assert that Allah is capable of the like of a servant's action, and also capable of what is not a servant's action.

Proof: The very object created by the servant (or its like) is a thing. Since Allah is Capable of all things, He must be capable of it. This proves the validity of one created object existing between two capable agents (Allah and the servant).

Our scholars assert that there is no effective cause (mu'aththir) except the power of Allah. They refuted:

1. The doctrine of inherent natures (tabā'i‘) held by the philosophers.
2. The doctrine of generated effects (mutawallidāt) held by the Mu'tazila.
3. The doctrine that the servant creates their own actions.

Proof: This verse indicates that Allah is Capable of everything. If any contingent event occurred not by Allah's power but by something else, that "something else" would have prevented Allah's power from acting upon what was within His power. This is impossible because anything other than Allah is contingent and created, meaning it is weaker than Allah's power. The weaker cannot repel the stronger.

This verse proves that the Divine Being is One.

Proof by Contradiction: If we supposed a second god existed, that second god would either be capable of creating something or not.

1. If incapable of creating anything, he is not a god.
2. If capable, then what he creates is a thing. By the verse, this thing must also be within the power of the First God ({And He is over all things Capable}).
3. This necessitates the occurrence of a created thing between two creators, which is impossible. If each were independently capable of creation, then each would be independent of the other, yet simultaneously dependent on the other (to avoid contradiction), which is impossible.

Al-Jahmiyya used this verse to argue that Allah is not a thing. Argument: If He were a thing, He would be capable of Himself, based on {And He is over all things Capable}. But being capable of Himself is impossible; therefore, He cannot be a thing.

Our Scholars' Response: The verse {Say: What thing is greatest in testimony? Say: Allah is witness} (Al-An'am: 19) proves that Allah is a thing. Therefore, we must restrict the generality of this verse. This verse thus proves that a specific exception (mukhassas) to a general statement (‘āmm) is present in the Book of Allah, and that restricting a general statement by rational proof is permissible, indeed, it occurs.

The majority of the Mu'tazila claimed that Allah is capable of creating falsehood (kadhib), ignorance (jahl), futility (‘abath), and injustice (ẓulm). Al-Nidham claimed He is not capable of them.

The Majority's Proof: Ignorance and falsehood are things. Since {Allah is Capable of all things}, He must be capable of them.

The proponents of Divine Transcendence use this verse to prove that Allah is free from occupying space (ḥayyiz) or direction (jiha).

Proof: If Allah were located in one space but not another, that space where He is affirmed to be would be distinguished from the space where He is affirmed not to be. If the two spaces were indistinguishable, the judgment that He is in one and not the other would be impossible.

1. The distinction between the two spaces in itself implies that space is an existent entity, because pure non-existence cannot be pointed to by the senses, nor can one part of it be distinguished from another in sensation, nor can it be the goal of a mover.
2. Therefore, if Allah were located in a space, that space would have to exist.
3. If that space existed, it would be a thing, and it would be subject to Allah's power, according to {And He is over all things Capable}.
4. If the realization of that space depends on Allah's power and creation, then Allah's existence must precede the realization of that space.
5. If Allah's existence precedes the space, then His existence in eternity was established without space or direction.
6. That which is eternal does not cease. Thus, it is proven that Allah is transcendent from space and location, eternally and perpetually.

Allah first said: {In Whose Hand is the Dominion}, and then: {And He is over all things Capable}. This suggests that His Hand holds the Dominion only if it is established that He is Capable of all things.

This aligns with what our scholars say: If the servant's desire were realized while Allah's desire was not realized, this would imply weakness and inability, meaning He would not be the absolute Owner of the Dominion. Therefore, the fact that He is the Owner of the Dominion necessitates that He is Capable of all things.

Qadīr is an intensive form of Qādir (Capable). Since He is Qadīr over all things, nothing should absolutely prevent Him from bringing about any of His potential creations.

This implies:

1. Nothing is obligatory upon Him, for if something were obligatory, that obligation would prevent Him from refraining from action.
2. Nothing ugly (qabīḥ) may proceed from Him, for if something ugly were possible, that ugliness would prevent Him from acting (if He were capable of avoiding it), meaning He would not be perfect in power, and thus not Qadīr.

And Allah knows best.

Verse 2: